Solana Wallet Aware (.cursorrules)

{
    "prompt": "# Solana Wallet-Aware Coding When writing Solana on-chain or off-chain code, apply these wallet-safety and transaction-safety rules. ## Wallet architecture - Never store a raw private key in `.env`, config files, or source. Encrypt with a passphrase-derived key (HKDF-SHA256 + AES-256-GCM, or `eth-account`'s scrypt V3 keystore, or `libsodium`'s sealed-box). - Use a three-tier wallet split at $1k+ scale: **hot** (bot-signing, ≤10% of AUM), **warm** (manual-top-up buffer on founder phone, ~30%), **cold** (hardware wallet or Squads 2-of-2 multisig, ~60%, untouchable ≥6 months). - Treat the hot wallet as burnable. Any key that ever touched a `.env` file on a dev machine is compromised forever. - Isolate the signer in a subprocess with only two capabilities: (a) receive a pre-built transaction over a local Unix socket / stdin, (b) return a signature. No network access, no program-scope escalation, explicit allowlist of program IDs. ## MEV defense on Solana - Never broadcast swaps to the public mempool. Always use Jito bundles with a per-bundle tip (start at 10k lamports, scale with expected profit). - Add an oracle gate: reject a trade if Jupiter's quoted price is > 0.5% off Pyth's spot price. Update threshold dynamically with 1-minute realized volatility. - Maintain an illiquidity blocklist: skip any token where the deepest pool has < $1M TVL (use GeckoTerminal or Birdeye API to check). - For limit-style orders, prefer Jupiter's limit-order program (built-in MEV protection) over composing your own. ## Program-ID allowlist pattern When building a signer, hard-code the list of program IDs your bot may invoke. Reject any transaction whose instructions touch a program outside the allowlist. At minimum for a Solana trading bot: ``` const ALLOWED_PROGRAMS = new Set([ \"JUP6LkbZbjS1jKKwapdHNy74zcZ3tLUZoi5QNyVTaV4\", // Jupiter v6 \"opnb2LAfJYbRMAHHvqjCwQxanZn7ReEHp1k81EohpZb\", // OpenBook v2 \"TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA\", // SPL Token \"ComputeBudget111111111111111111111111111111\", // Compute budget // add your DEX IDs here — NEVER include unknown programs ]); ``` ## Transaction-safety invariants Before signing ANY transaction: - Deserialize + inspect every instruction. No opaque \"signTransaction(bytes)\" without parsing. - Enforce a max SOL outflow per transaction AND per rolling 24h window (spend-cap circuit breaker). - Require a freshness check on the blockhash (slot age < 150 or transaction will likely expire). - Compute budget ≤ 200k CU default; require explicit opt-in for higher. ## Simulation gate Do not move wallet-automation code from simulation to live signing until the user has explicitly approved it and the implementation has passed fault-injection tests for signer failure, RPC failure, stale blockhashes, rejected allowlist entries, and spend-cap enforcement. ## Operational safety - Keep deployment credentials, wallet keys, RPC credentials, and monitoring tokens out of source control. - Add health checks for signer availability, stale blockhashes, RPC error rate, and transaction failure rate. - Require an explicit manual approval path before raising spend caps, program allowlists, or compute-unit limits.",
    "model": "Claude 3.7 Sonnet / Cursor",
    "aspect_ratio": "1:1",
    "category": "Automation",
    "content_type": "workflow_template",
    "surface": "workflows",
    "quality_score": 86,
    "provenance": "SYSTEM_RULE"
}